We investigate implications for the cost of capital in a model with agency conflicts between inside and outside shareholders, where the severity of agency costs depends on a parameter representing investor protection in Germany and Italy. Using firm-level data we find significant differences in shareholder protection and its implications for the firm's ownership structure and the cost of capital. Results indicate that concentrated inside ownership increases the cost of capital for Italian firms, while having no significant impact on the cost of capital for German firms. Evidence suggests that shareholder protection is stronger in Germany than Italy and that bank influence in Germany may serve to reduce investor risk for outside shareholders. Results suggest that slow growth in continental Europe may be more closely linked to institutional differences in shareholder protection between countries rather than inside ownership of firms. JEL Classification: G31; G32; E22; D92; O16
Introduction
Over the past decade European policy makers have expressed serious concerns about the slow growth of capital formation, entrepreneurship and high-tech investment, which has in turn motivated new policy initiatives to promote the development of equity markets, foster financial markets integration and improve legal harmonization. A key rationale behind the EU policy is that, similar to the US, it believes that by providing firms with better access to equity finance and venture capital, they would grow more rapidly than internal finance alone would allow.
1 However in spite of the development of various European stock markets in the 1990s, economic growth in the EU remains weak and recent evidence at the firm-level shows that even when companies "go public", their subsequent growth rates remain low, especially when compared to US firms.
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Several recent studies have pointed to the potential importance of differences in the financial contracting environment and the way legal systems protect investors to help explain differential growth rates between the US and Europe (see, for example, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, and Levine, 1999) . La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Vishny ("LLSV", 1998, 2000) , have shown that investor protection can be important in explaining why firms are owned and financed differently between countries. Cross-country evidence also shows that firms in countries with weak investor protection, such as many EU member states, have highly concentrated ownership (LLSV, 1999 and Barca and Becht, 2001 ). Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Love (HHL) (2002) expanded this work by deriving a structural econometric model in which the effects of the legal system are summarized to investigate the relationship among investor protection, inside ownership concentration, and the cost of capital using pooled data for 38 countries. They find that on the average, the higher the level of inside ownership, the higher is the marginal cost of capitaldue to the higher risk premium. This model is important because it provides a framework to explain the role of weak governance in the efficient accumulation of capital, such as that experienced in the 1990s in Europe.
Following HHL's model in this paper we empirically investigate the impact of investor protection on the cost of capital, where protection according to HHL (2002) refers to as "those features of the legal, institutional, and regulatory environment -and characteristics of firms or projects-that facilitate financial contracting between inside owners (managers) and outside investors" (p. 2). Our study extends previous work by providing a micro examination of firm level behavior and agency related problems in the 1990s in Germany and Italy; allowing a more detailed comparison of two allegedly similar "poor shareholder protection" countries, which in fact have two very different legal, institutional, and regulatory environments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the theoretical framework and predictions of our model. Section 3 briefly describes the institutional context in Germany and Italy, and the data. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and results. We conclude in Section 5 by discussing implications for policy makers concerned with addressing firm growth and financing issues within the European context.
The theoretical framework
The theoretical foundation of this study is based on the agency theory of the firm as outlined in Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen & Meckling (1976) , where agency problems between insiders and outsiders can arise because insiders can divert firm profits to themselves before paying out dividends. There is also a relevant treatment of these issues in the legal literature where different legal institutions reportedly have systematic influences on investor protection (LLSV, 2000, Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002) . More recently, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Love (2002) develop a model incorporating both the legal and financial strands of literature. The model introduces insider risk aversion as the offsetting cost of insider ownership. Specifically, poor investor protection (or more pointedly, poor protection of minority shareholders) favors insiders (controlling shareholders who control the decision-making of the firm) because it allows them to expropriate outside (minority) shareholders. Concentrated ownership is thus viewed as the response to, or the substitute for, the lack of legal protection, reducing agency problems and managerial slack (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) , or minority investors' expropriation -under the assumption that the dominant shareholder does not steal from oneself.
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We argue that the full consequences of lack of investor protection are not fully understood, particularly regarding its implications on the growth of the firm. Weak (minority) investor 3 Interestingly, reliance on this "second-best" solution to agency frictions may be the reason why, in many industrialized countries, company by-laws still include relatively few rules aimed at protecting minority shareholders. Although some progress has been achieved within the EU, as part of the legal harmonization program, much is yet to be done. For example, recent financial scandals in Italy (e.g. Parmalat and Cirio) have been interpreted as a consequence of the delay in the harmonization (See The Economist, January 3 rd , 2004).
protection and concentrated ownership may be detrimental to both the insider and the firm in that they prevent insiders from diversifying risk optimally and the firm from pursuing growth-oriented, risky capital projects, thus impeding optimal capital accumulation.
According to HHL (2002) , under imperfect investor protection, the entrepreneur/manager must retain an equity stake in the firm large enough to reassure minority shareholders that he will neither pursue value-destroying projects nor carry out expropriation. The insider will thus be forced to bear high levels of idiosyncratic risk for having a large bulk of his wealth invested in (tied to) the firm. By reflection, the insider will raise external funds (equity) in a proportion to the initial wealth invested in the firm that does not dilute his incentives, regardless of the actual amount of equity finance that would be needed to fund the firm's growth project.
Two consequences result from this agency problem. First there should be an additional premium in the cost of capital that reflects the additional idiosyncratic risk that the entrepreneur/manager is forced to bear, thus reducing in equilibrium the desired stock of capital.
And second, a suboptimal quantity of capital is raised on the equity market (at the time of the IPO, and subsequently). While we do not attempt to test for the second result, we note that debt to equity ratios are broadly quoted as in Germany and Italy are 1:1 vs. 1:4 for the US. The first consequence is one that we shall empirically examine in this study.
Insider ownership, stealing, and the cost of capital
Our model directly follows that outlined in HHL (2002), which we employ as follows. The model describes a firm where managers are in full control of the decision-making, and have access to a growth project. We assume that the firm has a Cobb Douglas production function, described by The manager's net return N it+1 in period t+1, after taking the firm public, is:
Because of agency problems between insiders and outsiders, when managers raise external finance they have to convince outside investors that they will receive a fair market rate of return (i.e. that stealing will not occur). 5 With imperfect investor protection, the managers have to commit to lower levels of future stealing by retaining a higher fraction of equity than would be optimal for them to fully diversify the firm-specific risk. Consequently, they are forced to bear high levels of diversifiable idiosyncratic risk. The tradeoff between risk and insiders' incentive to invest in risky capital projects determines the inside ownership stake in equilibrium. The empirical implications derive from the first-order condition that characterizes the optimal capital choice:
is the marginal profit of capital and the right hand side represents the firm's user cost of capital, where r is the risk-free rate and δ is the depreciation rate on capital. Γ and (γ -Γ)
represent the risk discounts in the cost of capital for (non-diversifiable) systematic risk and (diversifiable) idiosyncratic risk, which depend in turn on the stochastic discount factors of the market and of the manager, respectively. What is of interest here is that the idiosyncratic component exists because a large fraction of the insider's income is derived from the profitability of the firm. With poor investor protection, and α>0, there is an additional premium in the cost of capital, namely, α(γ -Γ) > 0.
The economic intuition of the model is that insiders assign a lower value to risky projects (and profits) than outside investors. Assuming (r + δ + Γ) constant, one can estimate (γ -Γ) by
, or marginal profit of capital, on inside ownership. and equipment, and Z it is a vector of variable factor inputs (e.g., materials, energy, unskilled production workers). Now assuming that the firm faces an inverse demand curve P(Y it ), variable factor prices w it , and fixed costs F, then the profit function is defined by
Measuring the Marginal Profit of Capital
Then by the envelope theorem, the marginal profitability of fixed capital, denoted MPK, is:
Where η is the firm-level elasticity of demand, α k is the capital share of output, S=PY is the firm's sales, and θ = (1+η -1 )α k is a scale parameter that may vary across industries because price elasticity of demand as well as the capital share of sales are different across industries. Thus, up to an industry-specific scale parameter, the ratio of sales to capital may be used to measure the marginal profitability of fixed capital. Assuming that firms are on average at their equilibrium capital stocks, the marginal profitability of capital should roughly equal the cost of capital, MPK it = r it + δ it , where r it is the risk-adjusted discount rate and δ it is the depreciation rate.
Industry-level estimates of θ can be constructed by averaging over all firms i and years t in industry j, and by assuming r + δ = 0.18 for all industries. Thus, for industry j, θ j is given by:
And, for firm i at time t,
is the measure of marginal return to capital.
In countries where investor protection is said to be generally low, the model predicts endogenously high levels of insider ownership. Accordingly, the idiosyncratic risk premium applied to the cost of capital should be high, implying a steady-state level of capital below the first-6 See Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) for detailed derivation and empirical estimates for US firms.
best level. This allows us to measure the real effects of corporate governance, namely that of the effects on the accumulation of capital of the firm. Specifically, we estimate the determinants of the fraction of equity owned by insiders, testing as predicted, whether this fraction depends on measures of investor protection. We depart from previous studies in that our empirical approach emphasizes the cross-firm dimension of investor protection. Thus, we test the prediction that investor protection has an important cross-firm and cross-cultural dimension by using data that is cross-sectional for Germany and Italy separately. In addition, we investigate the correlation between inside equity ownership and the marginal return to capital, a relationship that follows directly from the first-order condition for capital, where the cost of capital includes a risk premium that reflects the insiders' exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
To estimate these relationships we use two separate data sets tracking the behavior of Italian and German firms listed on the Frankfurt Exchange and the Borsa Italiana, respectively. In addition to using the financial data from annual reports of these firms, our study also employs detailed information on each firm's corporate ownership structure, including that on the identity and concentration of ownership.
German and Italian Institutional Frameworks and Data

German and Italian Institutional frameworks
In the economics literature Germany and Italy are often grouped together for analysis as countries where investors are weakly protected. We find this treatment is too generalized, particularly when one considers the fact that although they share the Romano-Germanic civil law tradition, their respective institutional environments have developed rather differently. Germany derives its laws from the German Commercial Code written in 1897 after Bismarck's unification of Germany, while Italy's company laws originates from the French Commercial Code, written under Napoleon in 1807. LLSV (1998) which provides a comprehensive and detailed overview of many of the differences between legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks across countries, concurs with our view by finding evidence of statistically significant differences between the institutions in countries following in the Germanic tradition (Germany) versus the French civil code tradition (Italy). We have adapted a few findings from a recent OECD report appropriately named
Removing Obstacles to Growth in Figure 1 in order to further establish this point. In essence, the 1990s were an important period of institutional change in Germany and Italy, both countries seeking to improve their "poor shareholder protection" status to improve the investment climate. We argue that empirical studies are lacking to provide a clear understanding of the underlying relationships at work, and hope that this study will provide a benchmark for gauging future policy.
Data
Our data came from two datasets, the first containing firms listed on the Frankfurt Boerse and the second contains firms listed on the Italian exchange in the 1990s.
The German financial data came from the Bonn Database, which contains a complete set of all firms listed on the Frankfurt exchange. We excluded firms that were involved in mergers, bankruptcies, acquisitions, changes in legal status, double listing of consolidated and nonconsolidated information for the same firm groups. This data was matched with detailed information on the ownership identity, concentration, and bank relationship for 80 of the firms for 7 Listed Companies Corporate Governance Committee of Borsa Italiana, "Report and Self-discipline Code", 1999, available at www.borsaitaliana.it . Similarly to the US and UK, the Corporate Governance Code requires the nomination of independent, non-executive directors, appointment of the audit, nominating and compensation committees, and the appointment of an Investor Relations Officer. 8 In its Annual Report for the year 2000, CONSOB recommends that the newly introduced reform of company law (Law n. 58/1998) will "pave the way to strengthened protection of shareholders".
which the information was publicly available. For a complete description of these data see
Chirinko and Elston (CE) (2005).
One important contribution of our study comes from the fact that we collected our databases from original sources, allowing us to construct more precise and meaningful measures of firminvestor relationships than is normally possible with commercial data. Specifically we crafted variables measuring the degree of inside ownership/control as follows. For Germany, because banking relationships are key components of the institutional environment for the firm, and a special case of inside ownership we needed to construct a bank influence variable. This variable is a composite measure of bank influence on the firm relating to information we collected on the concentration of equity ownership in the firm, the use of proxy votes of the firm, and the degree of bank representation on the firms supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). The construction of the variables indicating that the firm was controlled either by Insiders, Banks, or Institutions was done as follows. The Inside dummy variable takes on a value of 1 if either an individual or a family owns 25% of the firm or more, and no other owner owns more than 25%, in either 1991 or 1986. The
Bank variable indicates that a financial institution (bank or insurance company) either: 1) owns more than 25% of the firm and no other owns more than 25% of the firm, or 2) a bank owns 50% of the firm (even if some other owns more than 25%), or 3) if the % of non-employee representatives that are bankers on the supervisory board is 25% and the total proxy votes of banks at annual shareholder meetings is more than 10% or 4) the % of non-employee representatives that are bankers on the supervisory board is 10% and the total number of proxy votes executed by banks at annual shareholders meetings is 25% or more. This variable took the value of 0 otherwise, indicating minimal or no bank control over the firm activities. Note that under German corporate law, a 25% share of voting rights is sufficient to block any major proposal at the shareholders' meeting. The Institute variable indicates that either an institution (either a financial firm or a nonfinancial firm or both) owns 25% of the firm or more, and no other owner owns more than 25%.
Note that many of these measures are not mutually exclusive but represent alternative measures of insider control, and as such will be entered into the estimations separately to avoid multicollinearity in estimates (see Table A1 in the Appendix).
For Italy, we use a panel of Italian manufacturing firms constructed at CERIS-CNR using several sources. 9 Balance-sheet data are collected from two annual directories, Le Principali LLSV, 1999, and Bianchi, Bianco, Enriques, 2001) . In Italy, the percentages of equity held by the controlling shareholder and by insiders are very close -58.7% and 56.0%, on average in our sample, just after the IPO -because the initial owner/controlling shareholder (the entrepreneur manager who took the company public) usually sits on the board together with other members of the family. Most often, a «family», or an individual directly holds the controlling shareholding. Whenever it is held thorough a holding company, we could identify the ultimate owner in all but two cases.
12 five consecutive observations. Extensive information about the firm's income statement and balance sheet variables is matched with the firms' age, ultimate ownership, group affiliation and business activity. 10 For a comparison of public and non-public companies in Italy, and for the characteristics of Italian firms going public in the 1980s and in the 1990s, see Carpenter and Rondi (2004) . 11 HHL (2002) define it as the fraction of equity held by insiders, and use the "closely-held shares" variable from the Worldscope database for their cross-country analysis. 12 In Table A2 we summarize the main ownership and governance characteristics of the Italian firms in our dataset.
Estimations and preliminary results
A key feature of the HHL (2002)'s model is that investor protection may vary not only across
countries, but also across firms. "Investor protection is anything that exogenously increases the cost of stealing from outsiders" (p. 8), widening the scope of our search of firm-level determinants of investor protection. For example, tangible assets, such as factories, plants and equipment are difficult to steal and provide a "built-in" degree of protection to outside shareholders. Or, the identity of minority shareholders, such as institutional investors or financial institutions, may influence investor protection to the extent that they carry more (or less) political clout with law enforcement agencies. Further, in countries with poor investor protection, insiders may have a hard time selling equity and may wish to signal that they intend to respect their financial contracts. They may do so by voluntarily disclosing sensitive information, improving quality of accounting standards, or complying with a self-disciplining code of corporate governance, and so forth.
Hypotheses and Estimation Results
The empirical tests in this paper focus on two main hypotheses. First, we test if inside ownership depends on measures of investor protection by regressing inside ownership on variables that proxy the firm-specific, built-in degree of investor protection. Due to the different characteristics of the datasets, we adopt different estimation strategies to test this hypothesis.
Second, we test the prediction of the HHL (2002) model that the equilibrium level of inside ownership is positively related to the marginal return of capital, a relationship that reflects the additional idiosyncratic risk premium in the marginal cost of capital.
We first present the empirical results for the Italian firms, in Tables 1 and 2 .
In Table 1 In column (A) we find that the coefficient on the sales to capital ratio is positive and not far from significance, thus suggesting that intangibility of the assets (e.g. technological know-how, marketing capabilities, R&D activities) leads insiders to retain a larger fraction of the firm's equity.
Conversely, asset tangibility, i.e. assets that are difficult to divert or steal, would provide stronger built-in protection to outside investors, thus making it easier for the insiders to reduce their share in the firm. Both the Institutional Investor dummy and the STAR dummy enter with a negative and significant coefficient, as expected. Either having an institutional minority shareholder or featuring a record of transparency in the public equity market allows insiders to retain a smaller equity share.
The Corporate Governance dummy is the variable that we expect to best capture the built-in degree of investor protection. Consistently with the model predictions, we find that the estimated coefficient is negative and significant. When we enter the code's dummies separately (column B), we find that both the presence of Independent Directors and the existence of the Audit Committee display the expected negative effect on inside equity ownership.
Firm size enters with a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that inside ownership is higher at larger firms. This is in contrast with HHL's finding of a negative coefficient, which they explain by arguing that large size may ensure better protection to outside investors because of economies to scale to monitoring. Our result, however, appears more consistent with the Italian 13 The collection of this variable required special attention for two reasons. First, companies are only recommended, not required complying with the code. Second, many companies provided only vague descriptions of their compliance to the code (e.g. not indicating the number or names of independent directors, or whether non-executive and independent directors in the required proportions were in the auditing committee). Only companies that applied all three norms literally were assigned a dummy value of 1. 14 Listed firms have to notify shareholders' agreements, their content and duration to CONSOB.
institutional context, where small and medium firms may be motivated to adopt monitoring devices by their need to raise external finance in a weakly protected environment. The coefficient on the dummy variable indicating "Shareholders' Agreement" is not significantly different from zero.
The second test we carry out focuses on the predicted positive relationship between the level of inside ownership (α) and the marginal return to capital (MPK).
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From the first-order condition for the capital stock in eq.
[3], we obtain the following empirical model:
These regressions produce estimates of (γ -Γ), which reflects the average additional risk premium for bearing idiosyncratic risk, above the systematic risk premium (Γ), which is absorbed in the constant term.
In Table 2 , we report the estimated coefficients from regressing the marginal profitability to We now turn to our sample of German firms, where the empirical approach has to adjust to account for the presence of a major player in German capital and corporate market, as well as to a dichotomous dependent variable. Table 3 reports the results of the model in which the probability that the firm is dominated by an insider, that in the case of Germany is defined by a controlling family or individual (B), or banks (A), is a linear and function of firm-specific investor protections.
The set of explanatory variables includes firm size (the logarithm of total assets), R&D intensity measured as the ratio of intangible to tangible assets of the firm, and time and industry dummies. The significance of bank influence in apparently reducing the idiosyncratic risk of the investor may be due to the banks ability to better monitoring the firm and exercise more political clout with law enforcement authorities. We also hypothesize that bank influence may also serve as a signal of better protection to investors.
The coefficient on R&D (the ratio of intangible to tangible assets) is economically and statistically significant and positive for estimations A and B. If intangible assets (ideas vs. computers) are easier to "steal" or expropriate, then this would help explain why R&D is such a strong and positive indicator of bank influence. If R&D is endogenous, which it surely is to some degree, another interpretation is that firms with bank influence have better investor protection and would then also have an easier time financing R&D, in which case like bank influence would be an endogenous proxy for good investor protection. The negative and significant sign on R&D for family insiders is consistent with the notion that this variable captures idiosyncratic risk which is high in this case and is an endogenous indicator of weak investor protection.
In Table 4 we estimate the marginal product of capital as a proxy for the cost of capital as a function of Bank influence, Inside ownership, and size of the firm. While the negative significant sign on size indicates that larger firms have a smaller marginal cost of capital, which is to be expected due to better information sharing with creditors, better access to capital markets, etc.
However the coefficient on Inside is negative and significant while the one on Bank is positive but only marginally significant at the 10% level. These findings generally do not support the prediction that higher insider ownership or bank influence increases the cost of capital. This finding is not consistent with an institutional environment, which is weak in shareholder protection, particularly when compared to the Italian data results. These results are consistent with previous studies, such as Chirinko and Elston (2005) which find that bank influenced firms in Germany do not have greater debt levels nor lower costs of financing than independent firms in Germany.
Conclusions
In this paper, we empirically investigate the impact of investor protection on the cost of capital in Europe, where investor protection can be characterized "those features of the legal, institutional, and regulatory environment -and characteristics of firms or projects -that facilitate financial contracting between inside owners (managers) and outside investors" (HHL, 2002) . To date, research indicates the significance of these effects overall and the importance of examining differences between countries, but very few empirical studies has emerged to link firm financial behavior to the institutional environment.
Our findings suggest that for Italy, voluntary compliance with corporate governance norms as well as tighter liquidity and disclosure rules and asset intangibility have a negative impact on the concentration of inside ownership of the firm. We interpret these variables as proxies of firm specific "built-in" investor protections. Our results confirm that investor protection has an important cross-firm dimension in addition to the more familiar cross-country dimension, as suggested by HHL's approach.
In Germany we find an environment with both higher levels shareholder protection, and lower concentrated ownership than Italy, and no evidence of an external financing premium. Our results suggest that investors in large firms may seek inside bank influence as a means of increasing outside minority shareholder protection. Allowing for endogeneity in our interpretation of bank influence, these results also suggest that bank influence may to some degree, also serve as a signal of better protection to investors.
In Germany a firm's R&D intensity had a strongly positive impact on the probability that the firm would have bank influence but not on its propensity to have concentrated insider ownership otherwise, also indicative that firms with bank influence may provide better investor protection and/or have an easier time financing R&D projects. In Italy, institutional investment is negative determinant of inside ownership, suggesting that the presence of institutional investors may serve as a signal of better protection. In both countries, asset intangibility is a statistically significant determinant of concentrated inside ownership.
Finally our results for German firms suggest that bank influence has only a weak impact the firm's marginal cost of capital, consistent with earlier findings on the influence of banks on firm capital structure. In contrast, our evidence for Italy indicates that the higher the concentration of inside ownership, the higher is the implied cost of capital. This suggests that the magnitude of the distortions from the first-best level of capital stock may be large in countries with poor investor protection like Italy, concurring to explain underinvestment and slow growth. Note: The last column reproduces 2-digit SIC estimates of θ j by Gilchrist & Himmelberg (1998) . 
